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TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH: SOLUTIONS FOR
ENSURING GLOBAL ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL AIDS
MEDICATION IN THE WAKE OF THE PARAGRAPH
6 WAIVER
Jessica L. Greenbaum*
Approximately thirty-three million people worldwide are infected with
HIV. Two-thirds of those infected live in sub-Saharan Africa. 2 In 2007,
deaths caused by AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa represented seventy-five
percent of AIDS-related deaths globally.3  While the provision of
antiretroviral therapy has expanded dramatically, less than one quarter of the
estimated number of those in need of therapy in the sub-Saharan region
receive it.4  Eighty percent of those in clinical need of antiretrovirals
worldwide cannot gain access to the life saving medication.
5
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1. UNAIDS, 2008 REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 32 (2008),
http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/ [hereinafter
2008 UNAIDS REPORT]. See generally UNAIDS, FAST FACTS ABOUT HIV 1 (2008),
http://data.unaids.org/pub/FactSheet/2008/20080519_fastfacts hiv en.pdf ("HIV stands
for 'human immunodeficiency virus.' HIV is a virus that infects cells of the human
immune system . . . and destroys or impairs their function. Infection with this virus
results in the progressive deterioration of the immune system, leading to 'immune
deficiency."').
2. 2008 UNAIDS REPORT, supra note 1, at 39.
3. Id.
4. UNAIDS, AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE 2006, 10 (2006), http://www.unaids.org/en/
HIV data/epi2006/default [hereinafter AIDS UPDATE 2006].
TRIPS and Public Health
Lack of access to medication contributes to high death rates, particularly
in sub-Saharan Africa.6 Various factors contribute to the lack of access to
medication, but one of the largest barriers is the exorbitant cost of
antiretroviral therapy.7 The high cost of medication is a result of both patent
protection, which prevents the production of generic forms of antiretrovirals
to be sold at lower costs, and also the inability of many underdeveloped
countries to manufacture their own medication. 8 The competing interests of
patent holders and developing countries surround the issue of affordable
access to medication. 9 In 2003, the World Trade Organization (WTO)
proposed a waiver to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), known as the "Paragraph 6 Waiver,"
in order to create flexibility for developing countries and to allow easier
importation of cheap generic medication.i On July 17, 2007, Rwanda
became the first country to make use of the waiver." The fact that only one
5. UNAIDS, 2006 REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 155 (2006),
http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/H IVData/GlobalReport/2006/default.asp
(follow "7 Treatment and care" hyperlink) [hereinafter 2006 UNAIDS REPORT].
6. AIDS UPDATE 2006, supra note 4, at 10.
7. 2008 UNAIDS REPORT, supra note 1, at 157.
8. See id. at 157; Carlos M. Correa, Implementation of the WTO General Council
Decision on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, April 2004, at 1, http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/WTODOHA
_DecisionPara6final.pdf. [hereinafter Correa: Implementation] ("Many developing
countries and least developed countries . . . cannot produce either active ingredients or
formulations, due to lack of technology, equipment, human resources or economic
viability of domestic production.").
9. See John A. Harrelson, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS
Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and
Compassion, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 174, 175 (2001) (analyzing the level of patent
protection that should be afforded to pharmaceuticals in developing countries).
10. General Council Decision, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 1, 2003),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/TRIPS e/implempara6_e.htm
[hereinafter Implementation of Paragraph 6].
11. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification
Under Paragraph 2(a) of the Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of
2008
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country has used the waiver since 2003 suggests that the waiver has not
achieved its desired results.
It is now time to revisit the TRIPS agreement and determine how to
guarantee global access to essential medications. Part I begins with an
overview of the TRIPS agreement and describes the provisions that
specifically aim to protect public health. This section includes a discussion
of the history and development of the WTO, the creation of the TRIPS
agreement, the availability of compulsory licensing, and the newer
provisions and amendments such as the "Paragraph 6 Waiver" promulgated
to address public health. Part II asserts three problems the WTO failed to
recognize when it drafted the "Paragraph 6 Waiver" and concludes that such
problems have made the waiver ineffective in its goal of enabling access to
medication in developing countries. Included in this section is an analysis of
the problems faced by Rwanda and Canada, the first countries to make use
of the "Paragraph 6 Waiver." Part III provides three suggestions that will
solve the problems overlooked by the WTO and allow for a more effective
implementation of the "Paragraph 6 Waiver."
I: A LOOK AT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
AND ITS EFFECT ON PUBLIC HEALTH
A. Creation of the World Trade Organization and Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights
With technological innovations and increased mobility, countries
throughout the world have become interconnected in ways never thought
possible. In the 1980's, it became apparent that global trade regulations
were outdated and that a more complex system was needed to control trade
between countries. 12 In 1995, the WTO was formed as an international
organization to monitor and enforce "the global rules of trade between
nations." 13 According to the WTO, "[i]ts main function is to ensure that
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health-
Rwanda, IP/N/9/RWA/I (July 19, 2007).
12. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 15 (2007),
http://www.wto.org/ english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/tif e.htm.
13. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN BRIEF 1
(2008), http://www.wto.org/english/rese/doloade/inbr e.pdf (explaining that the WTO
replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) established after World
War II in 1948). GATT reduced tariffs as a way to increase trade in goods between
member countries. Id. at 3. GATT facilitated a stable multilateral trading system through
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trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible."' 14 The WTO is
governed by a multilateral trading system of agreements, negotiated and
signed by a majority of its member states and ratified in each member's
home government. These agreements work as contracts binding all
countries that are members of the WTO. 15 As of July 23, 2008, the WTO's
membership included 153 countries16
The WTO regulates world intellectual property rights through the TRIPS
agreement.' 7 According to the WTO, "[TRIPS] attempts to strike a balance
between the long term social objective of providing incentives for future
inventions and creation, and the short term objective of allowing people to
use existing inventions and creations."'18  TRIPS became effective on
January 1, 1995, at the same time the WTO came into existence, 19 and
according to the WTO it is considered to be "the most comprehensive
multilateral instrument on intellectual property" rights. 20 TRIPS creates a
minimum standard of intellectual property protection that all member states
must seek to incorporate into their own national legislation. 2 Article 1 of
rounds of trade negotiations. Id. As a result of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, which
spanned from 1986 until 1994, the WTO became effective January 1, 1995. Id.
14. Id. at 1.
15. Id. at 2.
16. Id. at8.
17. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Art. 1-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 84 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement],
18. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, FACT SHEET: TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENTS 1 (2006), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tripse/tripsfactsheetpharma
2006_e.pdf. [hereinafter TRIPS Fact Sheet].
19. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, OVERVIEW: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT,
http://www.wto.org/ english/tratop e/TRIPSe/intel2_e.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2008).
20. Id.
21. Obijiofor Aginam, Between Life and Profit: Global Governance and the Trilogy
of Human Rights, Public Health and Pharmaceutical Patients, 31 N.C. J. INT'L. & COM.
REG. 901, 909 (2006).
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the TRIPS agreement states that WTO "[m]embers shall be free to determine
the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement
within their own legal system and practice." 22 While TRIPS only provides
minimum standards of compliance, member states may enact legislation that
provides for stronger protection.
23
Article 27 of the TRIPS agreement states that, "patents shall be available
for any inventions, whether products or process, in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of
industrial application.' 24 Patents give an inventor the legal right to prevent
others from making, using, or selling a new invention for a specific period of
25time. The protection encourages development and innovation as it allows
patent owners to prosper and gain from their inventions. 26 Under TRIPS,
member states must allow patent protection for at least twenty years from
27the date the patent application was filed.
B. Exceptions to Patent Protection Under TRIPS: Compulsory Licensing
Under the TRIPS agreement, member states are not required to grant
patents in certain limited circumstances. 28 Article 30 of the TRIPS
agreement states, "[m]embers may provide limited exceptions to the
exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
22. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1.
23. Id.
24. Id. art. 27.1.
25. Id. art. 28.
26. TRIPS Fact Sheet, supra note 18, at 1-2.
27. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 33.
28. Id. arts. 27, 8, and 30. Article 27 of the TRIPS agreement states that
governments can refuse to grant patents under three circumstances that may relate to
public health: first, inventions whose commercial exploitation needs to be prevented to
protect human, animal, or plant life or health; second for diagnostic, therapeutic and
surgical methods for treating humans or animals; and third for certain plant and animal
inventions. Id. art. 27. The TRIPS agreement through Articles 8 and 40 says that
governments can act to prevent patent owners and other holders of intellectual property
rights from abusing intellectual property rights, "unreasonably" restraining trade, or
hampering the international transfer of technology. Id. arts. 8, 40.
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unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interest of the patent owner, taking
account of the legitimate interests of third parties." 29 This process is known
as compulsory licensing.30  The subsections of Article 31 of the TRIPS
agreement contain a list of requirements that must be met prior to the use of
a compulsory license, and as a result of such requirements it is only used in
very limited circumstances. 31  Under Article 31(b), which describes
compulsory licensing, "[t]he person or company applying for a license" to
use the patented product "must have first attempted, unsuccessfully, to
obtain a voluntary license from the right holder on reasonable commercial
terms. ' ,32 Under Article 31(h), if a compulsory license is issued, the patent
holder must still receive sufficient remuneration costs. 33 In addition, under
Article 31(b), the requirement of attempting to obtain a voluntary license
"may be waived by a member in the case of a national emergency or other
circumstance of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial
['governmental'] use.",34 There are also additional requirements that must be
met in order to obtain a compulsory license. The right to produce the
product cannot be given exclusively to the licensee.3 5 This ensures that the
patent-holder can also continue to produce the product.36 In addition, Article
31(f) requires that compulsory licenses be granted "predominantly for the
supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use."'37 This
29. Id. art. 30.
30. TRIPS Fact Sheet, supra note 18, at 4.
31. Id. See also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 31.
32. TRIPS Fact Sheet, supra note 18, at 4.
33. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 3 1(h).
34. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 3 1(b).
35. Id. art. 31(d).
36. TRIPS Fact Sheet, supra note 18, at 4 (explaining that one additional mechanism
for flexibility, known as parallel importing, allows for importation of patented products
without the authorization of the patent holder. This practice is also not specifically
referred to in the TRIPS agreement, but is referred to in Article 6 as "exhaustion of
rights." Once a product is marketed for the first time with the consent of the patent
owner, the patent owner has exhausted his or her rights and no longer has protection).
37. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 31 (f).
2008
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provision in particular created many problems which will be discussed
below.
C. Changes to the TRIPS Agreement: The Doha Declaration and the 2003
Decision on Implementation
In the years that followed the adoption of TRIPS, tension surrounded
compulsory licensing and questions were raised regarding the enforcement
of the agreement. 3 Developing countries worried about their ability to
comply with the strict provisions and deadlines.39 In a response to the
questions raised by TRIPS concerning public health, the WTO ministerial
conference in Doha, Qatar, adopted the Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health in November of 2001 (Doha Declaration).
40
The Doha Declaration stated that TRIPS "can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.
' 4 1
The declaration was an important acknowledgement by the WTO that
compulsory licensing may be difficult, not only because of the many
requirements that must be met prior to their use, but also because members
with insufficient or no pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities may be
unable to effectively use the provisions designed to provide access to
medication. 42 While the Doha Declaration affirmed the right of member
states to use compulsory licensing to obtain low-cost pharmaceutical
products in a national emergency, members who exported drugs produced
under compulsory licenses to countries without manufacturing capabilities
could still be sanctioned for violating Article 31(f) of the TRIPS
agreement.43  In paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration the WTO
38. Aginam, supra note 21, at 912.
39. Id. at 902-03.
40. See generally World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha
Declaration].
41. Id. 4.
42. Aginam, supra note 21, at 912.
43. Margo A. Bagley, Legal Movements in Intellectual Property: TRIPS, Unilateral
Action, Bilateral Agreements, and HIV/AIDS, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 781, 786 (2003);
see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 31(f) (requiring that a country authorize a
compulsory license for use predominantly in the domestic market).
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acknowledged that "WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing
capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making
effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement."
44
Paragraph 6 also called for "the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious
solution to this problem."
45
In 2003, the WTO addressed the paragraph 6 issue and further clarified
46the TRIPS agreement. The 2003 General Council Decision on TRIPS and
Public Health addressed and modified Article 31(f) of TRIPS, which
originally stated that any use of compulsory licensing "shall be authorized
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member
authorizing such use."47 The 2003 General Council Decision, which became
known as the Paragraph 6 Waiver because it addressed the concerns stated in
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, had a major impact on developing
countries that could not manufacture drugs domestically. Prior to the
Paragraph 6 Waiver, countries were unlikely to import generic medications
because member countries with the ability to manufacture pharmaceuticals
under compulsory licenses could not export the drugs due to the "domestic
market" requirement of Article 31(f). The Paragraph 6 Waiver specifically
addressed the domestic use requirement by stating that any obligation under
Article 31(f) "shall be waived with respect to the grant by it of a compulsory
license to the extent necessary for the purposes of production of
pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an eligible importing
Member(s). ' 48 This answered the question raised by the Doha Declaration:
exporting pharmaceuticals produced under a compulsory license to a
member state without such manufacturing capability would be acceptable.
The Paragraph 6 Waiver contains three waivers.49  First, "exporting
countries' obligations under Article 31(f) are waived. 50 Second, "importing
countries' obligations on remuneration to the patent holder under
compulsory licensing are waived" because remuneration is only required by
44. Doha Declaration, supra note 40, 6.
45. Id.
46. Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 10.
47. Id.; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 31 (f).
48. Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 10, 2.
49. TRIPS Fact Sheet, supra note 18, at 6.
50. Id.
2008
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the exporting country.5 1 Third, "exporting constraints are waived for
developing and least-developed countries so that they can export within a
regional trade agreement." 52 Although all member countries of WTO are
eligible to import under the Paragraph 6 Waiver, thirty-three developed
countries have declared that they will not import because they do not want to
undermine the intent of the provision and eleven more countries have said
they will only import during extreme emergencies. 53 After the Paragraph 6
Waiver, several potential exporting countries implemented the waivers into
their national legislation and now allow production for the export under
compulsory license. As of 2006, Norway, Canada, India, and the EU had
formally informed the TRIPS council of such changes in legislation.54
The Paragraph 6 Waiver was only an interim modification to the TRIPS
agreement. A decision to make the Paragraph 6 Waiver an amendment was
reached in December 2005. 55 The proposed amendment, identical to the
waiver, will become part of the TRIPS agreement when two-thirds of WTO
members accept it. 56 Though originally scheduled to occur by December 1,







55. TRIPS Fact Sheet, supra note 18, at 6.
56. Id.
57. WTO: TRIPS and Public Health: Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS
Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips e/amendment-e.htm (last
visited Oct. 30, 2008) (listing those members of the WTO that have accepted the
amendment as of 6 August 2008: United States, Switzerland, El Salvador, Republic of
Korea, Norway, India, Philippines, Israel, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong,
China, the European Communities, Mauritius, Egypt, Mexico, and Jordan). The TRIPS
council consists of all WTO members. Id.
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II: THE PARAGRAPH 6 WAIVER: HAS THE WTO REALLY FOUND A BALANCE
BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO
PHARMACEUTICALS?
The WTO and others have heralded the Paragraph 6 Waiver as a major
breakthrough for developing countries. The formal announcement by the
WTO and proposed amendment to the TRIPS agreement that compulsory
licensing and exporting of generic drugs under compulsory licensing are
acceptable means of gaining access to cheap generic medications was
supposed to save millions of lives threatened by disease. Then, why, in the
five years since the formal announcement of the WTO's commitment to
public health, has only one country notified the WTO of its intention to
import pharmaceuticals from another member state with manufacturing
capabilities?
A. Why Compulsory Licensing Will Still Not Work
Although ninety percent of those infected with the HIV/AIDS virus live in
developing countries, 58 almost eighty percent of these countries do not have
the means necessary to produce anti-retroviral drugs.5 9 One of the most
effective ways for developing countries to obtain large amounts of
medication is to import generics from another WTO member state capable of
producing the specific medication. This process has now been made
possible by the Paragraph 6 Waiver, however, there are several reasons why
the waiver has not been as successful as the WTO had hoped. First,
exporting countries must amend their own patent legislation to produce
generic drugs solely for export to countries that need them. 6° In the face of a
strong pharmaceutical lobby, this may be a difficult task for exporting
countries to undertake. 61 Second, because compulsory licensing under the
importing/exporting scheme was once prohibited by the TRIPS agreement,
the effects of past sanctions for engaging in such practices has lingering
effects which make developing countries reluctant to seek out exporting
countries. Finally, under the current scheme of compulsory licensing
58. World Health Organization, WHO Takes Major Steps Do [sic] make HIV
Treatment Accessible (Apr. 22, 2002), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/
release28/en/index.html.
59. Aginam, supra note 21, at 913. See also Correa: Implementation, supra note 8,
at 1.
60. Correa: Implementation, supra note 8, at 6.
61. Aginam, supra note 21, at 913.
2008
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proposed by the Paragraph 6 Waiver, remuneration costs to the patent holder
are to be paid by the exporting country, creating little incentive for such
countries to participate in the new compulsory licensing scheme.
The pharmaceutical industry has historically been the target of widespread
criticism for its positions on intellectual property rights.62 Much of the
criticism stems from the fact that pharmaceutical companies tend to charge
"high prices for treatments for diseases that heavily affect poor people that
are unable to afford them." 63  The global pharmaceutical industry is
composed of only a few companies and concentrated mainliy in the United
States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland. The present
industry makeup is due to high research and development (R&D) costs,
which average around 500 million dollars per new drug, regardless of
whether it ever enters the market.65  While it may be true that the
pharmaceutical industry needs to generate a large amount of money to
develop new medication, the industry as a whole consistently brings in
incredibly high profits. For example, "[i]n 24 of the 32 years between 1960
and 1991, the pharmaceutical industry held either the first or second position
in Fortune magazine's ranking of the most profitable sectors of the U.S.
economy." 66 The profitability of the pharmaceutical industry makes clear
that the high costs of medications are not necessarily a direct result of high
R&D costs. It is also likely that R&D costs are not has high as
pharmaceutical companies report. The numbers often include "substantial
marketing expenses that are only marginally relevant to therapeutic
innovation.
'" 67
62. See Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 834-
35 (2007).
63. Id. at 835 (quoting Graham Dutfield, Introduction to TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE:
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE, AND SUSTAINABILITY 6-7 (Christopher
Bellmann, Graham Dutfield & Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz eds., Earthscan Publications
2003)).
64. Nitya Nanda & Ritu Lodha, Access to Essential Medicines and Affordable
Drugs: Making Essential Medicines Affordable to the Poor, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 581, 581
(2002).
65. Id. at 581-82.
66. Id. at 583.
67. Yu, supra note 62, at 836.
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The pharmaceutical industry has also been criticized for putting "pressure
on developing nations to prevent the local manufacture or importation of
cheaper versions of the drugs produced in countries where either they cannot
be patented or where the patents are not respected.,, 68 Despite the WTO's
strong commitment to promoting public health, pharmaceutical companies
have not changed their position. 9 They maintain that "the pharmaceutical
business is extremely risky, and the research and development (R&D) costs
are always very high."7 °  To the companies who own pharmaceutical
patents, the notion that a government can use their product without the
permission of the patent holder seems unfair and counterproductive. 71 They
argue that such policies stifle innovation and create a disincentive for
pharmaceutical companies. 72  Pharmaceutical companies argue that long-
term patent protection is necessary for the development of new
medications.73 However, the high profits generated by pharmaceutical
companies make clear that "the actual need for incentives to invent ... is
much less than the industry has claimed."74
There is some evidence that the idea of compulsory licensing alone has
lowered costs of medication. The mere threat of a government right to issue
a compulsory license forces companies with patents to lower prices. 75 For
68. Id. at 835 (quoting Graham Dutfield, Introduction to TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE:
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE, AND SUSTAINABILITY, 6-7 (Christophe




71. See Lisa C. Pavento, Jamie L. Greene & John K. McDonald, International Patent
Protection for HIV-Related Therapies: Patent Attorney's Perspective, 17 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 919, 921 (2003).
72. See generally id. (discussing the perspective of pharmaceutical companies).
73. Yu, supra note 62, at 835-36.
74. Id. at 837.
75. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Report on the
Workshop on the WTO Decision on Access to Medicines at Affordable Prices for
Countries with No or Insufficient Manufacturing Capacities, 6(A), IP/C/W/439 (Feb.
23, 2005) [hereinafter TRIPS Report] (discussing that evidence confirmed prices of
certain patented products were lower than the price before negotiations for the adoption
2008
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example, in Brazil the threat of using compulsory licensing was used to
obtain concessions from major pharmaceutical companies. Even when the
Brazilian government did not issue a compulsory license, it used "the mere
threat of issuing one to reduce the price of individual HIV/AIDS retroviral
drugs by up to 75 per cent."77  Despite Brazil's success, threats may not
work elsewhere.78 Also, it seems the effects are only temporary; prices tend
to increase after threats subside or an application for a compulsory license is
withdrawn.
79
of the WTO decision. In a few cases, members attending the workshop reported that
drug prices had fallen to nearly one-tenth of the previous cost).
76. Yu, supra note 62, at 847; see also Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 26 (discussing the success of Brazil in producing copies
of brand-name drugs and Brazil's ability to force major drug companies to lower their
prices just by threat of compulsory licensing. The price of medications fell by an average
of seventy-nine percent. Furthermore, as a result of such practices the AIDS epidemic
stabilized in the country, and the death rate nationally was cut by about fifty percent.
"Brazil, by defying the pharmaceutical companies and threatening to break patents,
among other actions, has made drugs available to everyone .... Its experience shows
that doing this requires something radical: an alteration of the basic social contract the
pharmaceutical companies have enjoyed until now.").
77. Yu, supra note 62, at 847 (quoting Pedro Roffe with Ctistop Spennemann &
Johanna von Braun, From Paris to Doha: The WTO Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ACCESS TO MEDICINES 15 (Pedro Roffe, Geoff Tansey & David Vivas-Eugui eds., 2006));
see also Rosenberg, supra note 76, at 26.
78. Yu, supra note 62, at 847 ("Brazil was successful because it also possessed two
unique conditions that made its threat credible. First, the country has an indigenous
capacity to develop and manufacture pharmaceuticals, and that capacity created 'a strong
negotiating capacity for obtaining low prices from patent holders.' Second, Brazil
contains a lucrative middle class market that U.S. pharmaceutical firms cannot afford to
lose or alienate.").
79. TRIPS Report, supra note 75, 6(A) (explaining the counter argument that
experience of members at the workshop had shown prices of drugs increased when it
became "clear that a generic manufacturer would no longer be interested in obtaining a
compulsory license."). See also Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Distributive
Politics and International Institutions: The Case of Drugs, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
21, 46 (2004) ("[I]t seems more appropriate to view a price break as an isolated victory
that is materially important in the short term, but institutionally irrelevant in the long
term.").
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Because the mere threat of issuing a compulsory license is not adequate to
lower prices in the long-term, it is important for the developing countries
that cannot manufacture their own medications to feel that importing under
compulsory licenses is a real option. However, there is a strong tension
between pharmaceutical patent holders, often supported by powerful
countries like the United States, and countries that want to use compulsory
licensing to gain access to medication. ° In February 2001, the tension led
the United States to seek sanctions against Brazil and sent strong messages
to countries seeking to use compulsory licensing.s1 At the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body, the United States attempted to impose sanctions against
Brazil due to one of Brazil's intellectual property law provisions that
required holders of Brazilian patents to manufacture their products within
82 8 3Brazil. This was known as the "local working" requirement. Under the
provision, if a company did not comply with the requirement, its patent
would be subject to compulsory licensing after three years. 84 The United
States argued the Brazilian law compromised the rights of patent holders and
discriminated against United States patent owners. The United States also
argued that the Brazilian law violated Articles 27.1 and 28.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement. 86  The United States' widely criticized action 87 created
legitimate fear that countries could be subjected to reprisal in the form of
sanctions, litigation, and trade restrictions due to the use of compulsory
80. Aginam, supra note 21, at 909 ("[L]egitimate efforts by a few developing
countries to pursue these measures in the face of high prevalence of HIV/AIDS among
their populations were either blocked or legally challenged by some industrialized
member states of the WTO, especially by the United States.").
81. Ellen t'Hoen, Public Health and International Law. TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 27, 32 (2002).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 33.
85. Id. at 32-33.
86. Id. at 33.
87. t'Hoen, supra note 81, at 33.
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licensing." Many feared it would negatively impact Brazil's AIDS program
and deter other countries from seeking Brazil's help when developing their
own programs.89 Despite the fact that the United States eventually withdrew
the WTO panel against Brazil, 90 lingering effects remain throughout the
international community and may contribute to the absence of countries
making use of the Paragraph 6 Waiver.
Even if countries do not fear direct sanctions, the United States sent a
strong message for its distaste of compulsory licensing. For example, at a
WTO workshop, one developing country explained that while its "Ministry
of Health was pressing for the granting of a license on an urgent basis to
import drugs needed for treatment of HIV/AIDS, other ministries ... were
reluctant to support the proposal, as they considered that granting of such
licenses could have an adverse impact, in the long term, on the flow of
foreign investment., 92 Such fear is not uncommon and stems from both the
2001 litigation in Brazil and trepidation over angering large companies
based in powerful nations that hold patent rights. For developing countries
that are still attempting to come into compliance with other, more simplistic
provisions of the TRIPS agreement, engaging in the importation of generic
88. See Tony Karon, AIDS Drug Case Puts Our Idea About Medicine on Trial, TIME,
Mar. 5, 2001, available at http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,101494,00.html
(discussing a trial in Pretoria, South Africa, over the intellectual property rights of thirty-
nine drug companies against authorities in South Africa who wanted the right to import
the cheap generic medications).
89. Id. (discussing how Brazil's AIDS program serves as a model for some
developing countries that are unable to produce medicines locally. Brazil was
cooperating with developing countries, sharing technology and helping with the
production of generic AIDS medications prior to U.S. action against Brazil).
90. t'Hoen, supra note 81, at 33.
91. TRIPS Report, supra note 75, 1.
To assist countries in the effective implementation of the Decision, the
Commonwealth Secretariat arranged a Workshop . . . in Geneva on 12-14
October 2004, for discussions on measures that could be taken at national
and regional levels. The basis for the discussions was provided by case
studies undertaken in nine Commonwealth developing countries by
national experts with experience of work in the area of intellectual property
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medication produced under a compulsory license may not be worth the risk
of potential sanctions or trade reprisals.
Exporting countries also face significant challenges in creating legislation
that not only meets the requirements imposed by the WTO and provides a
humanitarian benefit to developing member countries, but that also benefits
its own country. Part of the problem is that exporting countries do not have
a strong incentive to enact legislation because currently they must
remunerate or compensate the patent holder.93 Guidelines do not exist for a
legislative and institutional framework that could be adopted at the national
level by countries with the capacity to produce pharmaceuticals under a
compulsory license with intent to export.94  This includes guidelines
regarding how much remuneration should be paid. At the above mentioned
WTO Workshop, it was suggested that "each country should have the
freedom to determine the appropriate level of remuneration to be paid,
taking into account... 'the economic value to the importing member of the
use of the patent right that has been authorized."' 95 The lack of guidelines
regarding remuneration may lead exporting countries to pay prices that are
either too high - and thus not worth any potential gains they would receive
as a result of producing the low cost medication - or too low - and thus not a
fair compensation value to the patent holder.
B. Implementation of Paragraph 6: For the First Time in Four Years,
Rwanda Tests the Water and Canada Tries to Help
The Paragraph 6 Waiver requires that developing countries notify the
WTO of their intention to become an eligible importing member as well as
which products they intend to import and the quantity of any drugs they
96intend to import. The WTO announced that Rwanda was the first member
93. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Implementation of Paragraph 11 of the General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 on
the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health, Annex to the Protocol Amending the Trips Agreement, Article 31bis
2, IP/C/41 (Dec. 6, 2005).
94. TRIPS Report, supra note 75, 3(C).
95. Id. (suggesting that "[i]f the exporting countries were to take into consideration
the economic value of production to the importing country, it may be necessary for the
exporting country to receive information from the importing country regarding factors as
to how the medicines will be supplied.").
96. Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 10, 2.
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state to notify them of intent to use the waiver in July 2007. 9 7 Rwanda
notified the WTO that it "wanted to purchase 260,000 packages of a triple-
drug anti-retroviral therapy, enough to treat 21,000 people for one year."
9
Canada was one of the first countries to enact legislation for the sole
purpose of exporting generic drugs to developing countries and its
experience is indicative of the problems presented by compulsory licensing
and the Paragraph 6 Waiver. 99 In May 2004, Canada amended its national
law, creating Canada's Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR) ° ° The law
became effective in May 2005.101 According to the Canadian government,
the purpose of the law is to, "provide a way for the world's developing and
least-developed countries to import high-quality drugs and medical devices
at a lower cost to treat the diseases that bring suffering to their citizens to
allow generic manufacturers to produce and export medication to developing
countries." 10 2 Before Canada will issue a compulsory license the law first
requires a generic company to obtain the permission, called a voluntary
license, from the patent holder. 0 3 This voluntary license requirement makes
the law even more rigorous than the standards for compulsory licensing
97. WTO, TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH, Patents and Health: WTO Receives First
Notification Under 'Paragraph 6' System, July 20, 2007, http://www.wto.org/english/
news_e /news07_e/public-health july07e.htm.
98. Unnati Gandhi, Generic Drug Problem Strangled by Red Tape, THE GLOBE AND
MAIL (Canada), Sept. 15, 2007, at F10.
99. For an excellent discussion of the problems associated with Canada's Access to
Medicines Regime, the effect of these problems on other developing nations, and
potential solutions for improving access to medication under TRIPS see generally
Christina Cotter, The Implications of Rwanda's Paragraph 6 Agreement with Canada for
Other Developing Countries, 5 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. R. 177, 185-86 (2008).
100. Holger P. Hestermeyer, Canadian-made Drugs for Rwanda: The First
Application of the WTO Waiver on Patents and Medicines, ASIL INSIGHT, Dec. 10, 2007,
http://www.asil.org/insights0712l0.cfm.
101. Id.
102. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, CANADA'S ACCESS TO MEDICINES REGIME, WELCOME
(2007), http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/index-e.html.
103. Unnati Gandhi, Supplying Generic AIDS Drugs Called Pricey Process, THE
GLOBE AND MAIL (Canada), May 8, 2008, at A5 [hereinafter Gandhi: Pricey Process].
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under TRIPS. 0 4 Once the company owning the patent grants a voluntary
license, the generic manufacturer must then obtain a compulsory license
from the Canadian Commissioner of Patents. °5 After these requirements are
met, the generic manufacturer can formally begin a bidding process with the
government of a developing nation.
10 6
For over a year, the Toronto-based generic drug manufacturer Apotex,
Inc. sought to obtain a voluntary license from manufacturers
GlaxoSmithKline, Shire, and Boehringer Ingelheim, each of which owns
patents on three components of a triple-fixed-dose, anti-viral AIDS drug
known as Apo-TriAvir that Apotex wanted to produce under CAMR.'
0
Despite efforts to negotiate, the pharmaceutical companies refused to give
Apotex a voluntary license. 1 8  It wasn't until after Rwanda sent its
notification to the WTO, that the companies changed their mind and
consented to the use of their patented drugs.' 0 9 On September 19, 2007, the
Canadian Commissioner of Patents, Murray Lewis, granted Apotex a
compulsory license" 0 and on October 4, 2007, Canada notified the WTO."'
104. See Cotter, supra note 99, at 185-86.
105. See id. at 186; Gandhi: Pricey Process, supra note 103, at A5.
106. Gandhi: Pricey Process, supra note 103, at A5.
107. Cotter, supra note 99, at 185-86. See also Gandhi: Pricey Process, supra note
101; Jillian C. Cohen-Kohler, Laura C. Esmail & Andre Perez Cosio, Canada's
Implementation of the Paragraph 6 Decision: Is It Sustainable Public Policy?, 3:12
GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH, at 2 (2007), available at http://www.globalizationandhealth
.com/contentl3/1/1 2.
108. Cotter, supra note 99, at 186.
109. Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS Report, Canadian Drug Company Awarded Rwandan
Contract to Provide Combination Antiretroviral, May, 12, 2008,
http://www.kaisemetwork.org/dailyreports/print-report.cfm?DRID=52061 &drcat=
[hereinafter Kaiser Daily]. GlaxoSmithKline gave consent to Apotex to use lamivudine
and zidovudine in August 2007 and Boehringer Ingelheim gave consent in July 2007 to
allow Apotex to use nevirapine. Id.
110. Canada Issues Compulsory License for HI V/AIDS Drug Export to Rwanda, in
First Test of WTO Procedure, 11 BRIDGES WEEKLY TRACE NEWS DIGEST 32, (Sept. 26,
2007), available at http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridgesweekly/6556.
111. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification
Under Paragraph 2(c) of the Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of
2008
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Finally, after meeting obligations under CAMR and TRIPS, Apotex was
able to begin negotiations with Rwanda and on May 7, 2008, Rwanda
accepted Apotex's bid.' 2  In a press release dated September 23, 2008,
Apotex announced that, "[t]he first shipment of seven million tablets, which
will help save the lives of 21,000 people is scheduled to leave from Toronto
on September 24th, 2 0 0 8 .
' 13
Over four years after CAMR was enacted, the first pills may finally be on
the way to help those in critical need of the medication. Four years?
Despite the obvious humanitarian objectives of the Canadian government, it
is clear that CAMR is too complicated and imposes requirements that are too
stringent.114 For example, the effect of the voluntary license requirement is
to allow pharmaceutical patent holders to stop the process at any time. 
15
Elie Betito, Director of Public and Government Affairs for Apotex,
explained that "nothing will be final until the drugs are delivered, [and] the
patent-holding companies can still withdraw permission for the sale to take
place 'even on the day we are shipping....... CAMR has also been criticized
by both developin countries and the generic pharmaceutical industry for
being too complex. V
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
IP/N/10/CAN/1 (Oct. 8, 2007) (announcing Canada's notification to the WTO of its
intention to export on October 4, 2007).
112. Gandhi: Pricey Process, supra note 103, at A5.
113. Press Release from Elie Betito, Director of Public and Government Affairs,
Apotex, to City/International Editors, Canadian-Made Life Saving HIV/AIDS Drug
Heading to Africa (Sept. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Apotex Press Release] (on file with
author). A second shipment of seven million doses of the drug is expected to take place
in September 2009. Id.
114. See generally Cotter, supra note 99 (explaining the criticism of CAMR from
both developing countries and the generic drug industry); Cohen-Kohler, Esmail, &
Cosio, supra note 107 (discussing the problems of access to medication from the
viewpoint of various stakeholders in CAMR).
115. Tanya Talaga, AIDS Drugs Fiasco a Tale of Red Tape; Generic Pills Could
Finally Reach African Patients After Years Lost While Canadian Officials Squabbled,
THE TORONTO STAR, Aug. 9, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.thestar.com/
article/244582.
116. Kaiser Daily, supra note 109.
117. According to Jack Kay, Apotex President:
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The experience between Rwanda and Canada is further proof that the
current system proposed by the Paragraph 6 Waiver is fraught with
problems. While the problems do not appear to be in the language of TRIPS
or in the language of the Paragraph 6 Waiver, there are still steps the WTO
can take to improve the process and ensure that the underlying goal of access
to medication is achieved.
III: How To SOLVE THE PROBLEM WITH A THREE PART PLAN: REAL
PROTECTION, MODEL LEGISLATION, AND GLOBAL COMPENSATION
A. Real Protection Against Sanctions and Reprisal
Despite the WTO attempts to assure developing countries that using
compulsory licensing to address public health crises such as HIV/AIDS is
acceptable, developing countries still fear reprisal.118  A specific
commitment by developed countries like the United States should be issued
so that those countries facing health crises can feel safe in their ability to use
the TRIPS compulsory licensing schemes. Unfortunately, a specific
commitment in the form of a public announcement - such as what occurred
when the United States withdrew litigation against Brazil - has not been
effective. More effective means should involve the threat of sanctions from
other international organizations, such as the United Nations or even from
the WTO, towards countries who engage in trade reprisal. This may prove
difficult because it is hard to determine when trade reprisals are a response
to compulsory licensing. If sanctions and pressure are placed on powerful
countries, perhaps this would be enough to deter countries from trade
reprisal and assure developing countries that they need not worry. Fear from
developing countries will also begin to dissipate over time as more countries
use the TRIPS waiver.
While we are extremely pleased to be able to make this important and
historic contribution, there is a reason no other company has tried to
provide medicines under this regime. It is too complex and has to be
repeated for every request that comes in from a country. For Canada to
truly be able to provide help, the regime must be changed. Apo-TriAvir
will save lives the moment the patients have access to it but it is now up to
the federal government to fix CAMR.
Apotex Press Release, supra note 113; see also Cotter, supra note 99, at 186-88.
118. See t'Hoen, supra note 81, at 33; see also TRIPS Report, supra note 75, at 439.
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B. Model Legislation and Benefits for Developed Countries Capable of
Producing Medication
Lack of cooperation of exporting countries remains a major obstacle.
Since 2003, only four developed countries have notified the WTO that they
have implemented the waivers and will allow for the production of
medication exclusively for export under a compulsory license."19 Because
Article 31(f) of TRIPS, prior to the Paragraph 6 Waiver, specified that
compulsory licenses were to be issued "predominantly" for the domestic
market, most national laws did not allow compulsory licensing for the
supply of export markets.' 20  Furthermore, as Carlos Correa notes,
"[i]mplementation of [Doha] through appropriate amendments to national
laws, as necessary, should not be regarded as a matter of mere convenience
or political choice. The Decision creates international obligations that must
be complied with in good faith.' 121 Thus, all members of the WTO with
manufacturing capabilities should make amendments to their current
national law with respect to the ability to issue compulsory licenses for
exporting purposes, even if they do not intend to export. However, as
evidenced by the faulty legislation enacted in Canada, member states need
assistance with this process.
To help members come into compliance, the WTO should propose model
legislation that individual governments can adopt. The WTO is better
equipped than individual member states to fully understand and incorporate
the needs of all parties involved in the Paragraph 6 scheme.'2 2 Model
legislation would make it easier for interested exporting countries to help
developing countries obtain critically needed medication at low costs.
Currently, no such guidelines exist.
119. TRIPS Fact Sheet, supra note 18, at 8.
120. Carlos M. Correa, TRIPS and Access to Drugs.- Toward a Solution for
Developing Countries without Manufacturing Capacity, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 389,
399 (2003).
121. Correa: Implementation, supra note 8, at 8.
122. See generally Cohen-Kohler, Esmail, & Cosio, supra note 107 (discussing the
continuing problems of access to medication from the viewpoint of various stakeholders
with respect to CAMR).
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C. Protecting Innovation: A WTO Fund to Compensate Pharmaceutical
Patent Holders
A further disincentive for developed countries with manufacturing
capabilities to export generic medications is that they are left with the
burden of compensating the patent holder."' Article 31(h) of the TRIPS
agreement requires that adequate remuneration be paid to the patent holder
taking into account the economic value of the authorization to use the
patent.124 The Paragraph 6 Waiver states that the exporting country must
pay remuneration or compensation to the patent holder; however, the
agreement defines neither "adequate remuneration" nor "economic
value."' 125 Exact amounts and methods for determining remuneration vary
but presumably a fair system would compensate patent holders for the loss
of their patent rights while maintaining the system's cost effectiveness for
countries issuing the compulsory licenses.1
26
One of the main reasons why a developed country wants to become an
eligible exporting country is the potential economic benefits. A generic
company in an exporting country creates revenue, jobs, and generally
benefits the economy. Requiring the exporting country to compensate the
patent holder is illogical because any benefits a country might gain by
having its own generic company be able to produce certain medications for
the purpose of exporting could be outweighed by the amount the country has
to compensate the patent holder. 127 Likewise, it is also illogical for the
importing country to be responsible for remuneration to the patent holder
because this would outweigh the benefits of importing cheap generic
medications under compulsory licensing. It would be unacceptable to allow
the patent holder who loses sole rights to ownership of the patent to be
uncompensated. This could have the stifling effect so many pharmaceutical
companies claim. The WTO should create a fund to solve this problem.
123. See TRIPS Fact Sheet, supra note 18, at 6.
124. Daniel R. Cahoy, Confronting Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha, 42
GA. L.R. 131, 150 (2007); see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 31(h).
125. Cahoy, supra note 124, at 150.
126. See generally id. at 152-53.
127. See generally id at 148-53 (discussing the importance of remuneration and the
underlying compensation problems at the heart of the Doha Agreement and 2003
Waiver). For a good discussion of the importance of remuneration and the underlying
compensation problems at the heart of the Doha Agreement and 2003 Waiver see
generally Cahoy, supra note 124, at 131.
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Developed member countries should generate money for the fund. This
action is justified under the WTO's goals of promoting harmony and
creating innovation because this will allow developing countries to "catch
up" faster and allow them to come into compliance with other provisions of
WTO at a faster rate.
In 2007, the estimated annual funding devoted to AIDS and available for
spending on low and middle income countries was ten billion dollars.128 The
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is one of the largest
contributors of funding. 129 By the end of December 2005, the Global Fund
had received 4.7 billion dollars in contributions. Pledges will bring the
cumulative total to 8.6 billion dollars by the end of 2008.130 By December
2005, the Global Fund had put 384,000 people on antiretroviral therapy for
HIV.131 These incredible numbers show how much money is being used to
help fund AIDS prevention and treatment. This money is given directly to
governments of developing countries. If the WTO creates the proposed fund
for the sole purpose of compensating pharmaceutical patent holders, more
people could be treated.
Money from any such fund must go directly to the pharmaceutical patent
holder. The fund will allow the exporting country to produce generic
medications at an even lower cost than they might have charged originally
because remuneration costs will not be a factor. The ability to charge lower
costs for the production of generic medication while still making a profit
would allow importing countries the ability to purchase a larger quantity of
medication for the same price and thus the funding they receive from
humanitarian groups such as the Global Fund will go further.
CONCLUSION
Thousands of people die from AIDS every day in countries that do not
have the resources to manufacture cheap generic medication. While the
WTO has approved the use of compulsory licensing to manufacture and to
import generic medications, only one country has attempted to use the
Paragraph 6 Waiver in the five years since the WTO's announcement. It is
clear that WTO's current attempt at "striking a balance between the long
term social objective of providing incentives for future inventions and
128. 2006 UNAIDS REPORT, supra note 5, at 224 (follow "10 Financing the response
to AIDS" hyperlink).
129. Id. at 240.
130. ld. at 241.
131. Id.
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creation, and the short term objective of allowing people to use existing
inventions" is weighted in favor of the long term objective of protecting
innovation and to the detriment of those people who desperately need
existing inventions.
132
This is a problem that can be solved. First, by ensuring that developing
countries do not fear reprisal or sanctions, they will be encouraged to either
seek out developed countries with manufacturing abilities or issue
compulsory licenses to manufacture medications themselves. Next, the
WTO can help potential exporting countries by creating model legislation
that will allow them to issue compulsory licenses for the sole purpose of
exporting cheap generic medications so that countries do not feel that the
task of creating such legislation is not worth the trouble it could potentially
cause. Finally, a "TRIPS" fund should be created that could be used for
remuneration of patent holders to ensure that the pharmaceutical industry is
adequately compensated, and to ensure the WTO's broader long-term goal
of providing incentives for future inventors. All WTO member states and
humanitarian organizations should contribute to this fund. If all of these
goals are accomplished a true balance can be found between the long term
benefits of protecting innovation and the short term benefits to be gained
from new invention. Most importantly, millions of people suffering from
AIDS will gain access to life saving medication.
132. TRIPS Fact Sheet, supra note 18, at 1.
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